Συμμετοχή της κ. Μαρίας Παύλου σε Διεθνές Πλατωνικό Συνέδριο

Τη Δευτέρα 5 Μαΐου 2025, η κ. Μαρία Παύλου (Επίκουρη Καθηγήτρια Αρχαίας Ελληνικής Φιλολογίας στη ΘΣΕΚ) σε συνεργασία με την κ. Ελένη Κακλαμάνου (Επίκουρη Καθηγήτρια Φιλοσοφίας στο Παν. Κρήτης) παρουσίασαν στο πλαίσιο του 14ου Διεθνούς Πλατωνικού Συνεδρίου (XIV Symposium Platonicum) την εργασία τους με τίτλο «Ἐπανόρθωσις in the Theaetetus». Λόγω ειλημμένων υποχρεώσεων της κ. Παύλου, η διά ζώσης παρουσίαση της εργασίας έγινε από την κ. Κακλαμάνου. Το Συνέδριο, που διοργανώνεται ανά τριετία από τη Διεθνή Πλατωνική Εταιρεία (Ιnternational Plato Society), είχε ως επίκεντρο τον Θεαίτητο του Πλάτωνα, και φέτος πραγματοποιήθηκε στη Μαδρίτη (5-9 Mαΐου). Σε αυτό έλαβαν μέρος κορυφαίοι μελετητές του Πλάτωνα και πέραν των 100 ομιλητών.

Περίληψη παρουσίασης

In the Theaetetus, one of the metaphors Plato frequently employs to describe and visualize the investigation of the question “What is knowledge?” is that of a circle. Socrates and his young interlocutor, Theaetetus, propose a definition—such as “knowledge is perception”—examine and review it, only to eventually reject it, returning to the original question, the ti esti (“what is it?”), to continue their inquiry. This process follows a circular pattern, similar to Euclides’ editorial approach in the proemium of the dialogue. Here, in addition to engaging in a dialogue with himself while transcribing, Euclides discusses his doubts and concerns with Socrates, making necessary corrections and adjustments (ἐπηνορθούµην) to the text.

In 167e-168a, ἐπανόρθωσις—though Plato does not use the term ἐπανόρθωσις directly, he employs the equivalent term ἐπανόρθωμα—is explicitly acknowledged as one of the most important features of dialectic, emphatically juxtaposed with eristic. It is stated that there are two forms of discussion: the “debate,” where participants engage in adversarial argument (agonizomenos), and the “discussion,” where they collaborate more constructively (dialegomenos) (Tht. 167e4-5). In the latter, one must take the discussion seriously and help one’s interlocutor rise to a higher level of understanding, turning them toward philosophy: “in discussion, he must be serious, he must keep on helping his opponent to his feet again, and point out to him only those of his slips which are due to himself or to the intellectual society which he has previously frequented” (trans. MJ Levett). ἐπανόρθωσις in action can be observed in various passages in the Theaetetus and other dialogues: 151e-152a, 161b, 199d-201c, 187e-188a. See also Meno 80d, Protagoras 333d-334, Phaedrus 257c-258a.

In this presentation, we propose to examine the function and role of ἐπανόρθωσις in the main part of the dialogue, highlighting its significance in philosophical inquiry.  Through ἐπανόρθωσις, Plato highlights the fluid and evolving nature of philosophical inquiry, where initial answers are rarely final and are always subject to revision. During a discussion, interlocutor A can “correct” interlocutor B’s misconceptions to help advance their mutual understanding. For example, in the Protagoras (340a), Socrates urges Prodicus not to allow Protagoras to misinterpret or disparage Simonides’ poetry, referring to this as a correction of the interpretation and a restoration of the poem’s true poetic significance. Protagoras’ response to Socrates carries even stronger implications: “Your correction (ἐπανόρθωμα), Socrates, contains a mistake greater than the one you are trying to correct” (μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ ἐπανορθοῖς). Similarly, Theaetetus asks Socrates to correct him if he makes any mistakes (πάντως γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε, 146c), and elsewhere, Socrates asserts that the young should correct the mistakes of the elderly (Grg.461c).

Further, we argue that it serves as a teaching method. By modeling correction and self-correction, Socrates encourages Theaetetus to approach philosophical problems with humility, recognizing that initial answers often need revision. This process allows Socrates and his interlocutor to revisit and refine their thoughts and arguments in real-time. It often reveals contradictions and deeper complexities within the definitions of knowledge that are offered. The passages under examination indicate that Socrates does not restrict himself to merely testing the definitions of his interlocutor, as he does with others. Before testing Theaetetus’ definition, Socrates must first help him find a way out of the impasse Theaetetus finds himself in. Using his art of midwifery, Socrates draws on Theaetetus’ own internal resources and helps him articulate and justify the rudimentary conception that lies within his soul. Hence, Socrates uses his dialectical method for two equally important purposes. First, he uses his method of questioning to induce labor in his interlocutor. Secondly, Socrates uses ἐπανόρθωσις to critically test the validity of the ideas produced and to evaluate the character of his interlocutor. The second purpose reflects Theaetetus’ positive attitude toward Socratic questioning. Unlike Euthyphro, Laches, and Meno, Theaetetus does not see Socrates’ questioning as an obstacle, but rather as something beneficial, helping him move beyond his initial impasse. Since Theaetetus displays a positive attitude toward discussion, he is more suited to engage in a genuine dialectical exchange with Socrates. If this is correct, then Socrates is also in a favorable position to carry out his dialectical method.